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Is new market creation a search and selection process within the theoretical space of all possible 
markets?  Or is it the outcome of a process of transformation of extant realities into new 
possibilities?  We draw upon Goodman’s (1983) Grue paradox to explain the dynamics of a new 
network of stakeholders.  The network is initiated through an effectual commitment that sets in 
motion two concurrent cycles of expanding resources and converging constraints that result in 
the new market.  The dynamic model was induced from two empirical investigations, a cognitive 




   
 Traditionally, markets have for the most part been assumed as givens in economic 
analyses.  Even strategic and marketing management have taken their cues from the exogenous 
markets of classical and neo-classical economics – rooted in rational choice at the micro level, 
and propelled at the macro level by the notion of Pareto optimality.  Take for example, Arrow’s 
(1974a) admission, "Although we are not usually explicit about it, we really postulate that when 
a market could be created, it would be." 
But more recently, the phenomenon of new markets is of growing interest to a variety of 
scholars.  A plethora of approaches and explanations vary from psychological (Carpenter and 
Nakamoto 1989, Earl 1998, Rosa et al 1997), sociological (White 1981, Fligstein 2002) and 
cultural (Douglas 1985, Wildavsky 1987) to those of evolutionary (Bianchi 1998), institutional 
economics (North 1990, Olson and Kahkonen 2001), strategy (Christensen 1997), and 
entrepreneurship (Venkataraman 1997).  Very interesting and intriguing advances have also been 
made through theoretical explanations involving complexity (Levinthal, 1991; Axelrod and 
Cohen, 2000), co-evolution (Barnett and Sorenson, 2002; Murmann, 2003), dynamic capabilities 
(Nelson, 1991; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2000), emergence (Malerba et al 1999) 
and other ways to tackle environmental endogeneity. 
We find this rich plurality both necessary and compelling in our own investigations.  But 
we also notice that there does not seem to be a coherent philosophical basis for these disparate 
threads of arguments about the creation of new markets, a la the predominate Utilitarian basis for 
rational choice in the face of extant markets and given goals.  This paper is an attempt to take a 
few early steps in thinking through a possible basis.  
We define the problem of new market creation in terms of the grue paradox and the new 
problem of induction, first identified by Nelson Goodman (1983).  This problem questions the 
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wisdom of looking at new market creation as a search and selection process within the 
theoretical space of all possible markets, as opposed to looking at it as the outcome of a process 
of transformation of extant realities into new possibilities.  We then present a thought 
experiment to develop appreciative theory (Nelson, 1995) for dealing with the problem.  At the 
heart of this appreciative theorizing is a dynamic and interactive model of a network of 
stakeholders that we call an “effectual network” that transforms current realities into new 
markets.  We illustrate the effectual network by briefly tracing the origins of several new markets 
for the Internet.  Finally, we show why it matters whether we look at new markets as artifacts in 
a grue world.   
DEFINING THE PROBLEM IN PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS:  
NELSON GOODMAN’S GRUE PARADOX 
Before we define the problem of how new markets come to be, we need to define the 
term “market.”  Like fundamental terms in any major line of inquiry – take, for example, ‘mass’ 
in physics, or ‘life’ in biology, markets are easier to argue about than to define.  The Nobel-
winning economist Ronald Coase once commented that markets – one of the two central 
institutions of capitalist societies (the other is firms) - had a “shadowy” existence in the 
economic literature (Coase 1988).  Part of this shadowy existence derives from the fact that the 
word “market” is used in a large variety of ways (Menard 1995:168).  In reviewing the literature 
pertaining to new markets, we concluded that the various descriptions could coalesce into three 
distinct categories:  (1) Demand; (2) Supply; and (3) Institutions.  Although it is still not easy to 
keep the three categories empirically separate, it may be theoretically useful to try. 
1. Demand-side view.  One way to define a market is as the demand for a good 
from “the set of actual and potential buyers of a product” (Kotler 1994:11).  Buyers constitute 
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the market by being willing to pay for a good based on their preferences for a certain 
combination of attributes (Lancaster 1971) that a particular good provides that buyers have the 
ability to exploit.  The market is referred to this way primarily by businesspeople and in the 
marketing and strategy literatures (Kotler 1994:12).  This sense in which the word “market” is 
used alerts us to the way in which individuals’ subjective preferences are seen as forming a 
“market” in which various goods (with various attributes) compete for selection. 
A large body of literature on the diffusion of innovations traces the development of new 
markets as the process by which a population of buyers adopts and exploits an innovation (Ryan 
and Gross 1943, Rogers 1995, Tellis and Golder 2002).  The dominant “stylized” fact about the 
diffusion process is the S-curve: the slow growth of the market, followed by a period of rapid 
growth which eventually slows (Geroski 2000:603).  New markets are therefore explained in one 
of three ways: by “epidemic” processes where the flow of information about an innovation 
explains market creation (Rogers 1995, Bikhchandani et al 1992); by rational economic 
processes where different buyers, with different characteristics and abilities adopt the innovation 
at different times (David 1969, Griliches 1957); and by legitimation processes, where the late 
“wave” of adoption is explained by institutionalization of the innovation, i.e. indicates that the 
market has become “taken for granted” (Tolbert and Zucker 1983). 
Scholarship has taken three approaches to the ways that changes in buyer preferences 
potentially create new markets.  The first approach is to ignore change and treat preferences as 
stable and outside the process of choice (Michael and Becker 1976, Adner 2002).  Within this 
analytical framework some scholars have still creatively demonstrated how dynamic 
consumption effects may be modeled (Stigler and Becker 1977).  The second approach is to treat 
preferences as liable to change but entirely exogenous to the market process (Shane 2003, 
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Fligstein 2002).  In this approach, changes in consumer demands are treated either as an 
opportunity responded to by alert entrepreneurs (Kirzner 1973) or as an exogenous “shock” 
suppliers attempt to cope with (Fligstein 2002).  The third approach takes an evolutionary view, 
treating demand as endogenous and co-evolving with changes in product offerings (Carpenter 
and Nakamoto 1989, Aversi et al 1999).  In this view alert consumers take advantage of 
consumption opportunities offered by the market (Gualerzi 1998, Robertson and Yu 2001).  For 
instance, Geroski (2002:28) argues that when new markets form, customers sample different 
product offerings and learn their preferences, which evolve from inchoate aspirations (ex: a 
desire for better communication) to articulated demand (ex: willingness to pay for a PBX 
exchange with specific features). 
2. Supply side definition.  On the supply side, the word “market” is defined by a 
product or service that firms are willing to supply.  This approach is formalized in the Arrow-
Debreu system (Debreu 1991) where a complete universe of all possible goods, including all 
contingent (state-dependent) goods, is pre-specified.  In this view, what defines the “market” is 
what is for sale, and markets – which are formally outside the analysis – are assumed to exist, 
subject to certain constraints (1974b, Loasby 1999:108-109). 
Three large literatures exist that take a supply-side view of markets.  Industrial 
organization (Porter 1980, Tirole 1988) and economic sociology (Carroll 1997, White 1981, 
Fligstein 2002) both define markets by the group of firms competing to sell a substitutable 
product.  White (1981) for example, states, “Markets are not defined by a set of buyers, as some 
of our habits of speech suggest, nor are the producers obsessed with speculations on an 
amorphous demand… [W]hat a firm does in a market is to watch the competition in terms of 
observables.” Similarly, Carroll suggests organizational ecology, “views the market as much the 
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consequence of organizational actions; in other words, as endogenous.” (Carroll 1997:120).  In 
both the industrial organization and economic sociology literature streams, new markets are 
outcomes of industry initiatives; they come to exist when industry dynamics or an exogenous 
change lead suppliers to introduce a new good. 
Scholars of technological change see new products as emerging from the technology 
commercialization process (Schumpeter 1934).  The sources of technological change have been 
much debated in this literature (Ruttan 1997, Mokyr 1990).  Early scholarship suggested demand 
factors were decisive, arguing that rapidly growing markets stimulate innovative activity 
(Schmookler 1966).  Later scholarship has suggested that technologies accumulate many small 
improvements and therefore develop in a path dependent fashion along a “technological 
trajectory” (Dosi 1982) that spawns new products and markets as it evolves.  Other scholars take 
a supply-push perspective, arguing that most new product categories result from technology 
change that is pushed-up by independent advances in science and technology (Rosenberg 1993, 
Geroski 2002), in particular by the emergence of “macro-inventions” (Mokyr 1990) some of 
which spawn general purpose technologies (such as the electric motor and transistor) with a large 
number of commercial market applications (Helpman 1998).  In this view, two factors make the 
emergence of new markets very unpredictable: the unpredictability of the pace of improvement 
in technology and the unpredictable combinations, or systems, of technologies that are assembled 
into final products (Rosenberg 1996).  Much of the literature follows Schumpeter (1942) in 
seeing the entrepreneur as the agent that puts new combinations of technology into consumers’ 
hands, in a process that pits new innovations against old, creating market “churn” (the 
substitution of one product market by another) and blowing “gales of creative destruction” 
through the economy. 
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3. The institutional view.  Institutionalists focus on various “frictions” (MacMillan 
2002:9) in the process of making exchanges.  These frictions make transacting costly and, since 
the costs of transacting must be taken into account in any market exchange, transaction costs 
reduce the amount of exchange and therefore limit the extent of markets.  A paper by 
Economides and Siow (1988:108) illustrates this point nicely by pointing to the fact that in the 
Arrow-Debreu model “with no friction there are as many markets as there are commodities”.  
However, once certain frictions are introduced, the number of markets is reduced.  One 
illustrative friction is the cost of making your way to a market (transportation costs).  Because 
traders prefer more liquid markets to less liquid ones, they trade off travel costs with the benefits 
of trading in more liquid markets; therefore markets without enough traders are extinguished 
(Economides and Siow 1988).  Other sources of friction include the costs of search, bargaining 
costs, and the costs of measuring and enforcing property rights (Coase 1988, North 1990, 
Williamson 1985).  Institutionalists see a market as, “a specific institutional arrangement 
consisting of rules and conventions that make possible a large number of voluntary transfers of 
property rights on a regular basis.” (Menard 1995:170).  Markets therefore make exchange 
cheaper than it would be without markets.  Sociologists add that market transactions are 
embedded in broader social institutions that create trust, and that reduces the cost of exchange 
(Granovetter 1985, Uzzi 1997). 
For institutionalists new markets are created by inventing ways to reduce friction – eBay, 
for example, is a market-maker (Casson 1982, Spulber 1997) that utilizes the internet to reduce 
the friction created by search costs, thus enabling new markets for a variety of products that 
could not easily be traded before the invention of the internet.  At the macro-level many scholars 
(Arrow 1962, Kahkonen & Olson 2000, North 1990) see an important role for “market-
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augmenting” governments in creating and enforcing the “rules of the game” in capitalist systems, 
in particular the system of property rights that are essential for markets to come into existence, as 
well as the wider body of regulations that enable markets. 
Current views of opportunities for the creation of new markets:  Is the grass green? Or 
blue (i.e some color other than green)? 
In sum, when we talk about the market for an established product like Coke, we include 
all three meanings of “market” specified above.  First, there are people who want to drink Coke 
and are willing and able to pay for it; second, there are people who are willing and able to make 
Coke for the price that customers will pay for it; and third, there exist a variety of institutions 
such as distribution mechanisms and FDA approval that allow/enable Coke to get safely from the 
producer’s hands into the consumer’s body.  The market for Coke is as easy to recognize as the 
fact that grass is green.  This is true of any well-established extant market. 
The problem of new markets, however, is not so simple.  Even the Coca Cola company 
found that out the hard way when it tried to introduce New Coke to replace the old formula.  As 
a variety of scholars have pointed out, the creation of new markets is fraught with incomplete 
information – and that is putting it mildly.  Even if we take demand as exogenous and relatively 
stable, there appears to be an infinite number of ways in which extant demand could be met 
through technological progress and the spread of free market institutions.  And if we throw in 
endogenously changing preferences into the midst, the problem quickly becomes intractable. 
Yet, entrepreneurs and managers have to deal with the problem of the creation of new 
markets.  Furthermore, they often have to deal with the creation of new markets concurrently 
with the necessity to survive in extant markets.  March (1991) captured the tradeoff inherent in 
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this problem as the relationship between exploration of new possibilities and exploitation of old 
certainties as follows:   
Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation.  Exploitation includes such things as 
refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution. 
 
The essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing competences, 
technologies, and paradigms.  Its returns are positive, proximate, and predictable.  The essence of 
exploration is experimentation with new alternatives.  Its returns are uncertain, distant, and often 
negative. 
 
A large number of empirical studies of the creation of new markets attest to the 
uncertainty, time lags and failures involved in the exploration of opportunities for new market 
creation.  The literature on diffusion alone includes almost 4,000 studies (Rogers 1995), and 
attests to the fact that most new markets are unpredictable ex ante, and take a long time to come 
to be, if they ever do come to be (Gort and Klepper 1982). 
So, if we ask the question, “How can an entrepreneur starting a new venture, or a 
manager in a large corporation, act on the problem of new market creation?”  the predominant 
answer today consists of some form of exploration of the universe of possible markets.  In other 
words, if the grass is not green, it has to be some color other than green – blue, for example – the 
other color being drawn from the spectrum of all possible colors.  Even though the spectrum may 
consist of an infinity of possible colors, and boundedly rational creatures may explore only a 
small portion of the spectrum at any given point in time, it is indeed possible to create new 
markets through a process of exploration – i.e., through search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation,  and so on. 
In “The Birth of a New Market,” for example, Bala and Goyal (1994) postulate that new 
markets are constantly “opening up” because of technological, political or regulatory changes, 
saying that the emergence of the new market then depends on the expectations of entrepreneurs 
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and their requisite attempts to enter the market.  In fact the rhetoric of “entry” pervades a 
substantial portion of the growing literature on new market creation (Ex: Geroski 2002).  Miller 
and Folta (2002) take a similar view in “Option value and entry timing” where they describe a 
firm’s decision to enter a new product or geographic market in terms of purchasing an option on 
being involved in the market.   
In the final analysis, either new markets exist in some theoretical sense and firms enter 
these new markets through a variety of exploratory strategies, or new markets emerge as a result 
of technological and institutional evolution of populations of firms engaged in adaptive processes 
of exploration and exploitation within a changing competitive landscape.  It is this “big picture” 
philosophy of a pre-existent universe of all possible markets as the micro-foundation for action 
that we wish to re-examine in this paper. 
In particular, we wish to postulate a new micro-foundation based on the reformulation 
suggested by Goodman (1978):  We have come to think of the actual as one among many 
possible worlds.  We need to repaint that picture. All possible worlds lie within the actual one. 
Goodman’s question:  How do we know the grass is green or blue, and not grue? 
In his provocative book Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Nelson Goodman introduced what 
he termed “the new problem of induction,” a mind-bending twist on David Hume’s original 
problem of induction.  Here is a restatement of the problem: 
Take the inductive conclusion, “All emeralds are green.”  This induction is derived from 
the fact that all instances discovered so far have been green.  From this we can make the 
inductive projection that emeralds discovered in the future will also be green.  In other words, all 
emeralds, past, present, and future, are, in fact, green.  At this point, Goodman introduces the 
disjunctive predicate “grue,” which applies to all those things that are green before time t, and 
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blue after time t.  We can set t at any arbitrary point, so long as it is in the future – say, June 1, 
2080.  Inductively we have to conclude now that all emeralds that we have observed till date are 
not only green, but are also grue.   In other words, there is as much evidence for accepting the 
hypothesis, “All emeralds are green,” as there is to accept the hypothesis, “All emeralds are 
grue,” We have no way of refuting this “fact.”  But by confirming the fact that emeralds are 
green and grue, we are also confirming the fact that they will be blue (or any other color we 
choose for that matter) in the future.  As Abrams (2002) puts it: 
… using what seems to be a standard inductive pattern on a property, i.e., being grue, seems 
to give us reason to believe that each emerald, somehow, will actually turn blue.   
      
The grue paradox, or Goodman’s new problem of induction has been re-stated and 
studied in a variety of domains other than philosophy.  Take for example, Akeroyd’s (1991) A 
Practical Example of Grue, where he applies it to the economic relationship between the 
percentage rate of unemployment and the percentage change of money wage rates known as the 
simple Phillips curve.  For the purposes of this paper, we do not want to jump into the deep 
waters of philosophical arguments as to what grue means in some universal sense – we leave that 
to the extraordinary number of able philosophers who are already at the job.  Instead, we begin, 
as many good philosophers do, with a rather simple, but illustrative example of the problem that 
is relevant to the phenomenon we are interested in examining, namely the creation of new 
markets – for example, in the case of the commercialization of the internet (Reid, 1997).   
Let us take a quick look at the chronology.  By 1985, the Internet was already well 
established as a technology supporting a broad community of researchers and developers (Leiner 
et al. 2002).  But it was not until 1993 that NCSA released the first alpha version of Marc 
Andreessen's "Mosaic for X," and 1994, when he and his colleagues left NCSA to start "Mosaic 
Communications Corp" (later Netscape).  Amazon.com launched its website in July 1995.  
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Netscape went public in August 1995, initiating the Internet Bubble on the stock market.  At the 
time, Nasdaq was still referred to as an OTC (over the counter) market, not the “virtual trading 
floor” we talk about today.  And finally, on October 24, 1995, the FNC (Federal Networking 
Council) unanimously passed a resolution defining the term Internet.  
In terms of Goodman’s predicates, we could call the Internet before January 1, 1994 (i.e. 
before the launch of Netscape), rInternet to signify the fact that the Internet was mostly used by 
researchers and academics at that time.  And the Internet after 1/1/1994 could be called cInternet 
to signify the fact of the Internet becoming really hot commercial property. 
First, from the supply side.  How would a founder/developer of rInternet discover the 
commercial potential for cInternet?  Second, from the demand side.  How would a manager at 
Barnes and Noble discover the potential for dInternet (retail distribution through the Internet)?  
Third, from the standpoint of institutions.  How would organizations such as the FNC converge 
on a definition of the rInternet/cInternet or xInternet?  Or an over-the-counter market such as 
Nasdaq come to be known as a virtual trading floor on the tInternet?   
It seems almost immediately obvious, given our understanding of markets today, that the 
various actors involved needed to explore xInternet to discover dInternet, tInternet, and so on, 
and the developers of rInternet must stand ready to exploit the new markets for cInternet, when it 
gets discovered.  And as the chronology shows, March’s insight that the returns to exploration 
are uncertain, distant, and often negative, forms a pretty good explanation of why it took so long 
for people to discover cInternet.  As we know, underlying the worldview of exploration is the 
philosophy that there pre-exists a universe of all possible markets that compete for the winning 
candidacy – a space of xInternet, as it were – and this space may be so vast and/or so sparsely 
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populated with good solutions as to require enormous amounts of search and experimentation, 
not to mention dead-ends along the way.   
But there is another explanation for why Barnes and Noble did not launch the first 
dInternet bookstore; or why Nasdaq could not envisage that tInternet was the way to go.  And 
that explanation has to do with the fact that new market creation is an isotropic process.  Isotropy 
refers to the notion that it is not at all clear a priori, which pieces of information are relevant to 
the search for a solution (Fodor, 1987).  In Goodman’s terms, a phenomenon that looks ex post 
like an exploration of xInternet markets, or the exploitation of rInternet for commercial purposes, 
is in actual fact gInternet (grue Internet) ex ante.  In other words, the Internet is grue to begin 
with and no amount of information can actually specify all possible xInternet markets before 
those alternate markets actually come to be.  We no more have a way of refuting the fact that 
rInternet is grue than we have of refuting Goodman’s fact that all emeralds are grue.  
Furthermore, even as rInternet gets transformed into cInternet, the Internet continues to remain 
gInternet.   
The interesting question for us then becomes, how does one act under the assumption that 
new market creation is an isotropic process, as opposed to the assumption that any actual market 
is one of many possible markets that in theory could be specified ex ante if only all information 
were available a priori?  And what difference does it make whether we suppose markets are 
green/blue, or that markets are grue? 
WHEN MARKETS ARE GRUE:  A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
To clarify key elements of our theoretical development, we use a thought experiment 
(Folger, 1999).  The thought experiment is encapsulated in a dynamic model of how 
entrepreneurial action transforms extant reality into new markets through a chain of stakeholder 
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commitments over time.  We call the resultant network of stakeholders an effectual network.  
First, we will briefly outline the dynamic model as it is laid out in Figure 1, and then describe in 
detail the commitment at the heart of the model through a thought experiment.  We will then 
generalize the thought experiment and describe how a chain of commitments forms the effectual 
network that transforms extant realities into new markets. 
Dynamic model of an effectual network and new markets 
The dynamic model, graphically represented in Figure 1, has been induced from two 
empirical studies, Sarasvathy (1998) and Dew (2003).  The former consisted of a verbal protocol 
analysis of expert entrepreneurial decision making, and the latter chronicled the history of the 
RFID (Radio Frequency Identity) industry. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Currently major threads of research in entrepreneurship are based on the green/blue 
paradigm of exploring the universe of all possible markets (however locally or globally) and then 
exploiting those that are most predictable, and/or score high in terms of expected return 
calculated a priori or some formal or informal version of real options logic.  We call this a 
causal process that begins with exploration resulting in the identification, recognition or 
discovery of an opportunity, followed by a series of tasks to exploit the opportunity.  The 
standard set of causal tasks includes (a) developing a business plan based on (b) extensive 
market research and (c) detailed competitive analyses, followed by (d) the acquisition of 
resources and stakeholders for implementing the plan, and then (e) adapting to the environment 
as it changes over time with a view to (f) creating and sustaining a competitive advantage.  In 
this view, if an entrepreneur wanted to start a restaurant, he or she would start by identifying a 
high potential location, analyzing the competition in the area, identifying particular target 
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segments, developing menus, décor, and marketing strategies to fit the targets, obtaining 
necessary funding, hiring the appropriate chef to develop the right menu and then opening the 
doors to the restaurant.   
As Figure 1 shows, effectuators, in contrast, may or may not start with an “opportunity.”  
Instead they start with who they are, what they know, and whom they know, and begin acting 
upon whatever they can afford to do.  Most important of what they can do is to call people they 
know or meet, and plunge straight into negotiating a series of commitments.  We will examine 
these initial commitments in great detail in the thought experiment below.  For now, it is 
important to note that the opportunity (real or perceived or otherwise) does not determine who 
comes on board.  Instead, those who come on board, and what they commit to the enterprise, 
together with other contingencies that occur along the way, determine what opportunity gets 
created.  
The ensuing chain of commitments sets in motion two contrasting cycles.  The first cycle 
increases the resources available to the venture by increasing stakeholder membership in the 
effectual network; and the second accretes constraints on the venture that converge into specific 
goals that get embodied in an effectual artifact over time.  In the restaurant example above, the 
effectual entrepreneur may or may not start with a location.  Instead it would all depend on who 
the effectuator is.  If the effectuator is a cook, he might start a catering service, or a lunch 
service, or even just hire himself out as a chef who does house-calls – it depends on what he can 
afford to invest in terms of money, time, and emotion.  An expert effectuator would not even 
jump into one of these projects.  She would start by calling people she knows and start putting 
together partnerships and commitments.  For example, if she knew someone who owned a 
grocery store, she might partner with them and start making dishes for their deli.  Or if she 
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knows someone in the popular media, she might get involved with them to start a production 
company that makes cooking videos.  And so on.   
In the causal (green/blue) world, the end product is determined by the initial 
“opportunity” identified by the entrepreneur through exploration, and the adaptive changes over 
time to exploit the pre-selected “market” and/or “vision” that is initially “envisaged” as existing 
in the theoretical space of all possible markets.  Success or failure of the venture would depend 
on how accurate its predicted vision turns out to be and how well it executes strategies based on 
that vision.  The process in the effectual (grue) world is fundamentally different.  The end-
product of this process is inherently unpredictable at the beginning of the process because the 
process is actor-centric: it depends on which actors come on board with what commitments.  In 
fact, the opportunity gets produced through a process that continually transforms existing 
realities into possible markets.  In our ensuing analysis of the effectual commitments at the heart 
of the process outlined in Figure 1, we will concurrently trace the expanding network and the 
converging artifact or new market. 
The initial commitments 
To understand how the first effectual commitment initiates the network of stakeholders 
that transforms extant reality into new markets, we turn to a thought experiment.  Although we 
believe that this thought experiment can be generalized to a variety of situations under which 
new markets come to be, for the sake of precision and clarity, we will restrict ourselves to the 
creation of a new market for a new product, say widget X.   [Note:  Widget X need not be 
technological.  It can be something in nature such as a lemon, or it could be a service, a work of 
art, a minor irritation, a major problem, or an actionable idea].  
 
Let us assume Entrepreneur E brings widget X to Customer C to make a sale.  [Later in the 
analysis, we will show that C can be any kind of a potential stakeholder, such as an investor, a supplier, a 
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strategic partner, etc.]  Also, for the moment, it does not matter whether we assume that E is proceeding 
causally (i.e. has found C through predictive approaches such as market research) or effectually (i.e has 
found C through non-predictive mechanisms such as through her existing social network or some kind of 
a garbage can).   
Let us further assume that she wants to sell 1,000 units of X to C at $100 a piece.  Let us now 
imagine that C says the following: 
“I will gladly buy X if only it were blue instead of green.”  (Of course, the very first C may or 
may not say this, but we assume E keeps talking to people she knows or meets until she finds the first C 
who is interested) 
Now E has a decision to make.  Should she go ahead and invest in making the widget blue (cost 
$10 K, say)?  There are several criteria she may consider in making this decision.  First, she may or may 
not have the $10 K needed to make the modification.  Second, if she does make the modification, C may 
or may not buy.  Third, there may or may not be other possible customers (say, D) who may be willing to 
pay >$100 (say, $120) per unit for a green X – i.e. for the widget as is, without any modification. 
Assuming that E has the money to make the modification, E needs a mechanism that will decide 
whether C is indeed a customer (T = True) or is actually a non-customer (F = False) who will not buy the 
modified blue X.  This mechanism, like any other mechanism we can devise will of course be prone to 
two types of errors.  It may either classify C as a non-customer (F) when C is in fact a customer (T) [Type 
I error]; or, it might classify C as (T) when C is actually not a customer (F) [Type II error].  Again, 
assuming E has the money to make the modification, there are 3 possible solutions to this problem:   
Solution 1:  Using the exploration paradigm, E goes in search of other possible customers D first.  
If no D exists, then E gets C to sign a contract that penalizes C if he decides not to buy the modified 
widget.  [Note:  This is psychologically highly unlikely unless E and C have an ongoing relationship of 
trust.  In the case of an emerging new network, C faces two types of uncertainties leading to contractual 
hazards here.  (a) E may not be able to deliver the modified widget as per contracted specifications 
(unknown competence); or (b) it might not be possible to specify very clearly in advance what exactly C 
wants modified and C could find himself in trouble by signing an incomplete contract]. 
Solution 2:  E invests (or goes out and raises) $10 K in expectation of the net profit due to the 
order from C.  Without an enforceable contract, this expectation is unreliable at best as a decision 
criterion.  But E could also do this effectually, using the affordable loss principle – i.e. not with the 
expectation of any net profit from a potential transaction with C, but merely as an investment that she 
could afford to undertake (and lose) with imagined possibilities of other uses for the blue widget in case C 
chooses not to buy.  In this weakly effectual case too, this investment is not a reliable one for market 
creation except in its potential for exaptation (Dew et al, 2004). 
Solution 3:  The final solution to the problem is the strongly effectual one consisting of any 
mechanism that reduces Type I errors at the cost of incurring Type II errors.  In other words, the effectual 
commitment always favors the error of letting possible customers go as opposed to letting non-customers 
drive the decision process.  In our current thought experiment, the strongly effectual solution takes the 
form of the following counter-offer to C: 
“It will cost me $10 K to make the modification you suggest.  I will make the modification if you 
will put up the $10 K up front.  In fact, if you will pay for the modification, I will even supply you the 
modified widget at $80 per unit, so ultimately you will end up saving money on this purchase.” 
[Note that this solution does not require E to search for all possible D’s before making the 
counter-offer.  And this explicit ignoring of opportunity costs is what makes it different from exploration.  
We will examine the logic for this in a separate section below]  
Let’s now examine C’s decision as to whether he wants to commit $10 K for transforming green 
X into blue.  Again, (1) C may or may not have the $10 K; (2) E may or may not deliver the modified 
widget; and, (3) C may be able to find someone else to make the blue X for < $80 a piece.  Assuming that 
C has the money, while in the causal case it is obvious that he will invest it with E only of there is no one 
who can supply blue X at < $80, effectuation suggests he make a counter-offer to E as follows: 
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“I will invest $10 K to transform your green widget into blue X.  But, instead of a discount on the 
price, I would like to take equity in the product and share future returns on it.” 
  The two effectual counter-offers together transform the relationship into a partnership that 
commits both to a blue widget world.  Furthermore, under this partnership, both C and E need to specify 
blue X only to the extent possible at this time, leaving it up for re-negotiation as they together develop the 
product.  E’s contractual commitment to undertake the modification signals her private estimation of her 
own competence, and C’s investment of $10 K identifies him as an actual customer (T). 
 
In this thought experiment we have assumed that C knows he is indeed a customer and E 
knows herself to be a supplier.  But the effectual commitment would work even if we reversed 
this assumption – i.e. if we assumed that C and E have high levels of goal ambiguity, with C not 
quite sure that he actually wanted X and E not quite sure that she wanted to make X (green or 
blue or otherwise), as if neither knew whether there was a market or even a latent market for X.  
By meeting each other and coming up with terms that were doable within the constraints of their 
current lives, and then actually committing themselves to those terms, they set in motion a chain 
of commitments.   [Note:  There is no guarantee that this will indeed happen.  All we wish to 
show here is how it could happen].   We will now trace the consequences of such commitments 
actually occurring in the world. 
The first consequence is that when two stakeholders make a commitment, they are de 
facto behaving as though the market is grue – i.e. they are transforming green X into some X 
other than green, including X’s no one could have imagined before the actual transformation, and 
NOT selecting between a green X and a blue X.  In our thought experiment, this transformation 
process happens as follows:  By walking into C’s office and making the counter-offer based on 
the effectual commitment, E became a supplier de facto.  And by actually investing in E, C 
became a customer de facto.  Each did not have to be 100% certain about their own potential as 
the two sides of this commitment until the actual moment of commitment.   
Their mutual commitments forge an initial network of stakeholders that eventually 
transforms extant reality into a new market.  To the extent that widget X is unformed and 
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negotiable, this market is not a phenomenon of discovery but of transformation leading to the 
creation of something new, which makes the market for X an outcome of the interaction between 
C and E.  Initially, neither party knows what this X may or may not be worth down the road, or 
even whether it will be green or blue or something neither imagines at this moment.  The entire 
process is driven by interaction – the stakeholders prospectively negotiate the very existence and 
shape of X.  The content of the negotiation is not much concerned with the opportunistic 
potential embodied in the green vs. blue widget (for neither party knows what this X may or may 
not be worth down the road or even whether it will be green or blue or something neither 
imagines at this moment).  Instead the content of the negotiation is about what each would like X 
to look like and what each is willing to “commit” to make it look like what s/he wants it to be.  
Thus, the set of commitments that define an effectual network consist in agreements to 
participate in the transformation of an existing widget, rather than in agreements to appropriate 
future payoffs arising out of calculated/predicted evaluations of a new invention.  
In other words, C and E are negotiating for what X “will” be – not in a predictive sense 
(although prediction may or may not be part of the reasons for negotiating between green and 
blue ex ante), and not in a social construction sense (although the world may or may not actually 
come to consist of blue widgets ex post), but merely in the sense that both actually invest in a 
blue widget world and actually begin making blue widgets.  Even more importantly, their 
negotiations proceed as though X is grue – i.e. that X is transformable from green to colors other 
than green; not that X is a choice among one of any given set of colors.  The actual color, 
therefore, may or may not be something either had imagined till their interaction at the 
negotiating table.  There is always room for the actual transformation to surprise them with a 
color neither knew existed.   The point of disjunction for the predicate ‘grue’ in the context of 
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new markets is not some arbitrary point t in the future, but the act of commitment by two 
stakeholders to a particular future X.   
Generalizing the thought experiment 
At this point we can take the discussion back to Figure 1 and see how the atomic 
interaction within each effectual commitment results in the two cycles that increase the size of 
the network and the resources available to it at the same time constraining the possible goals of 
the stakeholders to converge into a new market.  Also, we can now generalize the thought 
experiment into a wide variety of new market contexts and iterate it over time.  For example, C 
and E can be angel and entrepreneur, instead of supplier and customer.  Or, they can be two 
random entities (individuals or organizations) with problem components and/or solution 
components that match, resulting in a strategic partnership that then leads to the creation of a 
new market based on the combined solution they forge.  And so on.  In general, X can be any 
component of a market including demand side elements such as needs and wants, supply side 
components such as technology, product and/or service, as well as institutional structures of a 
market such as channel, regulatory infrastructure, standards bodies, and so on.   
In this general conceptualization of X, each new membership in the effectual network 
negotiates a tiny piece of the future market – a pleasing or meaningful juxtaposition of two or 
more fabric patches, as it were – and the market that comes to be eventually is like a quilt 
stitched together through the effectual network as it grows and gradually transforms extant 
realities into the familiar artifact of the market.  In essence, then, each new member in the 
network not only brings certain resources to the venture, including who they are, what they 
know, and whom they know, but also a set of constraints on what transformations can be carried 
out on X.  In other words, each additional hand that seeks to shape the artifact firms up parts of 
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the clay, as it were, necessitating fewer and fewer transformations that are meaningful and useful 
in the future.  It is this shared accretion of constraints that eventually gets embodied in the 
demand and supply schedules, as well as the institutional structures of the new market. 
The effectual nature of the commitment process allows the members of the network to 
proceed as though the universe at any given point in time consists entirely of only the people 
who are at the table – as though the external world is relevant only to the extent it is embodied in 
the aspirations and abilities of the people at the table.  In other words, the particulars of who they 
are, what they know, and whom they know matter and drive the creation of the pie or the final 
artifact the network ends up cooking up.  It is only when the dish is done and the aroma begins to 
waft out of the room that both the issue of opportunism (who gets what piece of the pie) and 
opportunity costs (what other pies may be “out there”) become more relevant.  We will examine 
that transition next, as a dialectic between the members of the network and the external world.  
[Note:  In the interests of uncluttered exposition, we will examine the two issues of opportunism 
and opportunity costs in more detail later in the paper] 
The market as artifact, or How the effectual network grows into a new market 
As the effectual network grows over time, and includes more and more of the external 
world, it tends to become less effectual as it eventually coalesces into an empirically distinct new 
market.  In this section, we envisage this transition as a dialectic between members already on 
board and the external world.   
In his seminal work, Sciences of the artificial, Simon (1988) described the artifact as 
lying on the thin interface between the inner environment and outer environment.  As all things 
artificial, the market created by an effectual network too eventually becomes a dialectic between 
inner and outer environments where each comes to resemble the other in important ways – just as 
 22
   
shovels are designed to take the shape of the earth they need to scoop up at one end and the 
hands that hold them at the other (Simon, 1988).   
The new market, however, gets fabricated, not through the designs of any one person, but 
as a chain of interactive commitments that form the interface between the inner environment of 
the effectual network (current members of the network), and the outer environment (current non-
members).  At any given point in time, the effectual network is impacted by one of three 
categories of things:  (1) interactions that become embodied in actual additional commitments; 
(2) those that do not; and (3) non-negotiable exogenous states of nature.  The resultant artifact, 
i.e., the new market that comes to be, is an outcome of how the network deals with each of these 
three categories  
Category 1:  Interactions that become embodied in actual commitments.  We have 
examined this category in great detail in our thought experiment.  In sum, interactions that 
become embodied in actual commitments determine new membership in the effectual network, 
as well as the initial shape of the artifact and its transformations into particular market structures. 
And as we saw earlier, the effectual network proceeds for the most part by ignoring the external 
world, except in as much as the external world is embodied in the actual members of the 
network.  As the network adds members, however, there is less room for transformational 
negotiations with newcomers.  Eventually, the network reaches a point where, new members 
have to take most of X as they find it, or forgo membership in the network.  At around this point, 
interactions that do not become embodied in actual commitments carry vital information to the 
survival of the new market.  
Category 2:  Interactions that do not become embodied in actual commitments.  
Each negotiation that does not result in a commitment signals one of two possibilities:  (1) It 
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suggests significant transformations yet to be negotiated to fabricate the new market, or (2) It 
points to existing alternate markets or other effectual networks that may eventually coalesce into 
alternate markets that compete with and dissolve the nascent market being formed by the 
effectual network under consideration.  In other words, while each actual commitment 
transforms current reality into features of a new artifact, rejected commitments point to bounds 
for the transformation and signal finite alternatives to be explored.   
With regard to interactions that do not result in actual commitments, members of the 
effectual network can respond in one of three ways: 
• They can ignore them and continue to build the network effectually; 
• Begin exploring some alternatives to growing the network effectually; or, 
• Declare the effectual transformation complete and begin competing with alternative markets. 
In any case, there comes a point of time in the transformation process, when the effectual 
network has coalesced into a market – i.e. when the continual effectual churn at its outermost 
edges tapers off and barriers get shored up around its key components.  Once the chain of 
commitments has converged into a distinct new market, at least for a reasonable length of time, 
the effectuators need to craft and implement strategies based upon the exploration-exploitation 
paradigm.  This transition can either occur naturally as the effectual network converges to a new 
market, or can be actively determined by members of the network in light of competitive 
networks in the making.  How this transition point actually occurs in the creation of particular 
markets is a matter for future empirical investigations. 
We have some hints about how entrepreneurs transform their decision making from one 
primarily based on a grue world to one where exploration/exploitation becomes more useful.  In 
the effectual or grue phase of the fabrication of the artifact, entrepreneurial actors continually 
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make up stories and visions of the artifact even as they garner commitments from incoming 
stakeholders who seek to shape and reshape these stories and visions.  But the point when the 
artifact becomes a thing on its own is often heralded by a metaphor that comes alive or a clear 
vision that captivates the imagination of all concerned.  This “Vision” then becomes the 
compelling vehicle of communication that accelerates the entire process and really solidifies the 
remaining structures of the new market.  Take for example the term, “information 
superhighway” coined by Al Gore in 1994 in the case of the cInternet.  
Category 3:  Events completely exogenous to the process.  This brings us to the final 
piece of the dialectic between effectual network and outer environment, namely the part that is 
completely exogenous to the process.  This could consist in exogenous shocks (positive or 
negative) such as those in the macroeconomic/regulatory environment or in the technology 
regime, as well as some kind of internal contingency such as the exit of a key member of the 
network.  In case of such contingencies, complete and cascading failure of the effectual network 
may not be avoidable, just as explosive growth of the new market may become possible.  In any 
case, such contingencies will call for a certain amount of responsive re-shaping of the artifact in 
question.  To the extent that the collective imagination of the network internalizes and leverages 
these contingencies as input into the shape of X the network will continue to grow and coalesce 
into the stable artifact of a new market.   
To summarize 
We began our development of a new philosophical basis for the creation of new markets 
by positing a dynamic model of stakeholder interaction.  This dynamic model, graphically 
represented in Figure 1, illustrates how an entrepreneurial actor begins with who he is, what he 
knows, and whom he knows, and sets in motion a network of stakeholders, each of whom makes 
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commitments that on the one hand increase the resources available to the network, but on the 
other, adds constraints to future sub-goals and goals that get embodied into particular features of 
the artifact.  Over a period of time, assuming the network keeps growing and is not dissolved due 
to exogenous shocks or fatal conflicts within its ranks, the pool of constraints converges into the 
new market.  At the heart of this dynamic model is the atomic notion of an effectual 
commitment.  The effectual commitment has several characteristics: 
1. It focuses on what is controllable about the future and about the external environment, irrespective of 
their predictability; it also explicitly eschews predictive information that cannot be encapsulated into 
controllable events. 
2. Each effectuator commits only what s/he can afford to lose, and not what may be calculated as 
necessary to achieve predetermined target returns or outcomes. 
3. Who makes actual commitments and what they negotiate in terms of features of the artifact 
determines the goals of the network; pre-existent goals do not determine who is induced to come on 
board. 
4. As means available to the network increase, goals achievable become more and more constrained.  In 
other words, what the artifact can look like becomes solidified over time even as many more ways of 
how to make it look like what the stakeholders want it to be become possible. 
5. The key to the process here is not selection between alternatives (be they alternative ends or means), 
but transformation of existing realities into new alternatives through a growing chain of effectual 
commitments.  Harking back to Goodman’s vision:  We have come to think of the actual as one 
among many possible worlds.  We need to repaint that picture. All possible worlds lie within the 
actual one. 
 
When markets are grue:  Transforming rInternet into cInternet 
We emphasized earlier that the point of disjunction for the predicate ‘grue’ in the context 
of new markets is not some arbitrary point t in the future, but the act of commitment by two 
stakeholders to a particular future X.  And then we showed how that initial commitment sets in 
motion an effectual network that grows even as it transforms extant realities into a new market.  
Such a commitment in the history of the Internet can be located in the partnership between Jim 
Clark (founder of Silicon Graphics) and Marc Andreessen, who wrote Mosaic, the first web 
browser. That commitment launched "Mosaic Communications Corp" that later became 
Netscape.  Three different descriptions of how the commitment came to be are provided in 
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Appendix 1.  The descriptions are taken verbatim from (1) a historical account by Reid; (2) an 
anecdotal report on a Stanford University website; and (3) a newspaper article published in USA 
today.    Taken together, the narratives suggest the following facts about the commitment: 
1. Both Clark and Andreessen were doing their own thing, and did not envision commercializing the 
Internet.  Clark knew virtually nothing about the Internet, and Andreessen knew nothing about 
business. 
2. Foss, who came upon Mosaic, and showed it to Clark, did not know Andreessen. 
3. Neither Clark nor Andreessen searched for other possible partners before committing to the project – 
i.e., they did not take into account of any D, before committing to C. 
4. Clark and Andreessen were not part of the same social network.  Even after Clark and Andreessen 
met, they did not quite trust each other and had to work at building a relationship. 
 
We earlier illustrated how an effectual commitment embodies the point of disjunction in the grue 
nature of new markets as opposed to an arbitrary point of time t in Goodman’s formulation.  
Now we turn to understanding the role of opportunism and opportunity costs in this crucial 
moment of transformation in grue markets. 
OPPORTUNISM AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS IN A GRUE WORLD 
At the beginning of our analysis of the effectual commitment, we asked two questions.  
First, how can an entrepreneur/manager act in a grue world, as opposed to a green/blue world?  
And what difference does it make whether s/he acts as though she is selecting from one of many 
possible markets or as though she is transforming existing realities into new markets?  We have 
analyzed the first question in great detail and illustrated that the key difference lies in ignoring 
opportunity costs – i.e. NOT exploring beyond the first effectual commitment; and then letting 
the growing network of stakeholder commitments determine what the new artifact will be.   
We can postulate that each commitment consists of two parts that go hand in hand in both 
world views:  (i) the commitment to X, the artifact; and, (ii) the commitment to C, the network.  
The pivotal difference between the grue weltanschauung, as opposed to that of green/blue is that 
in the grue world, the commitment to C trumps the commitment to X.  In other words, in the 
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green/blue world, the entrepreneur/manager commits to a vision of the new market, and that 
vision then drives their strategies as to which stakeholders they seek to bring on board.  Both X 
and C in the green/blue world are chosen through processes of exploration – i.e. searching the 
space of possible alternatives (under standard assumptions of bounded rationality).  The problem, 
in this case, has to do with when and how the search is brought to a halt.  Presumably, the answer 
to that problem depends on the stated goals of the enterprise.  Criteria for evaluation of 
alternatives are developed based on performance goals, and selection may be based either upon 
standard NPV calculations or some form of real options logic. 
In the grue world, the commitment to X, of course, is always tentative, always subject to 
change through the terms negotiated by new stakeholders coming on board the network.  Perhaps 
the grue artifact X is more usefully conceptualized as a series of transformations xi, rather than 
the notion of any one X.  The commitment to C, however, is substantial and very real, as C will 
have a real voice in future stakeholder interactions.  Furthermore, the commitment to C not only 
involves actual commitments to particular transformations of X, but also involves an explicit pre-
commitment not to explore alternatives D before making the commitment.  It is this binding 
constraint of limiting oneself to the bird in hand with regard to stakeholders that clearly 
distinguishes action in the grue world from decision making in the green/blue world.  Now the 
question for the grue world at the point of commitment to any particular stakeholder becomes, 
“Why are opportunity costs with regard to other possible stakeholders ignored?” 
A textbook definition of opportunity cost would calculate the cost of an action A as the 
value of the alternative opportunity O given up in choosing A over O (Jensen, 1982: 48).  
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Buchanan1, however, whose Cost and Choice is acknowledged as the canonical analysis of 
opportunity costs, is a bit more subtle and elegant in the opening paragraph of his preface (1969): 
You face a choice. You must now decide whether to read this Preface, to read something else, to 
think silent thoughts, or perhaps to write a bit for yourself. The value that you place on the most 
attractive of these several alternatives is the cost that you must pay if you choose to read this 
Preface now. This value is and must remain wholly speculative; it represents what you now think 
the other opportunity might offer. Once you have chosen to read this Preface, any chance of 
realizing the alternative and, hence, measuring its value, has vanished forever. Only at the 
moment or instant of choice is cost able to modify behavior. 
 
Yet, we have argued above that the effectual entrepreneur/manager explicitly ignores the 
value of D and brings C on board purely based on the fact that C makes an actual commitment to 
modify X – i.e. fabricate a piece of the new market.  Since each effectual commitment involves 
both a commitment to a transformation of the artifact X, as well as a commitment to a specific 
stakeholder C, we will look at each in turn next.  
Committing to X:  The problem of means and ends 
By keeping motivations completely unconstrained in our analysis, we are in full 
agreement with Buchanan’s position that choice influencing opportunity costs are entirely 
subjective.  In other words, how exactly particular individuals calculate the values of their 
alternatives ex ante and whether they calculate their expected opportunity costs at all is irrelevant 
to our analysis.  What is relevant is the assumption that effectuators see X as transformable and 
not completely pre-determined. 
In a green/blue world, alternatives matter in a different way than in a grue world.  In the 
former, alternatives are searched for and drawn from a universe of all possible alternatives – i.e. 
in this world, commitment to X, is a commitment to X as the goal of action, and the allocation of 
                                                 
1 Because proponents of Austrian economics have built upon Buchanan’s views on this subject, it might be 
dismissed as not well received in mainstream economics.  But Buchanan is very much in line with leading 
economists such as Hayek and Coase, and as Hartmut Kliemt notes in the Foreword to the book, 
… Buchanan distances himself somewhat from the Austrians. Avoiding what he regards as the "arrogance of the eccentric," Buchanan 
makes a serious effort to integrate his views into the orthodox classical and neoclassical framework.  
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resources is between alternative means to achieve the pre-selected goal.  In the latter, alternatives 
are envisaged as possible transformations of existing realities – i.e. commitment to X is a 
commitment to a certain course of action xi that may or may not lead to any envisioned X.   
In this regard, our positions on ends and goals may be worth clarifying.  Our analysis is 
consistent with the fact that goals exist in hierarchies (Simon 1964).  Also, while goals at the 
highest levels might be clear, their operationalizations at lower levels may be highly ambiguous.  
Take for example the motivations of an entrepreneur who may want to make $40M by age 40.  
This ‘goal’ while it may appear specific and clear is not easy to translate into immediate sub-
goals that can actually be acted upon – i.e. it does not provide a compelling reason for the 
entrepreneur to commit to any particular X.  In this sense, an actor may experience high levels of 
goal ambiguity even in the face of a clear vision of what s/he wants down the road.   
Our analysis is also consistent with questioning the assumptions that underlie the idea 
that human action can best be understood as the pursuit of pre-conceived goals.  As Joas (1996) 
observes, some of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century including Dewey, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Ryle have challenged those assumptions, and have argued for  
…the impossibility of defining human life as a whole in terms of chains of means and ends.  …If 
we summarize these admittedly quite discrete arguments showing the limited applicability of the 
means-ends schema, we find that neither routine action nor action permeated with meaning, 
neither creative nor existentially reflected action can be accounted for using this model.  (pp. 156) 
 
Instead, Joas locates human action firmly within the continual interaction of the human body 
(corporeality) with the real world (situation) and with other people (sociality): 
The means-ends schema cannot be overcome until we recognize that the practical mediacy of the 
human organism and its situations precede all conscious goal-setting.  A consideration of the 
concept of purpose must ineluctably involve taking account of the corporeality of human action 
and its creativity.  (pp. 158) 
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In a green/blue world, choice of ends precedes choice of means; in a grue world, as we saw in 
the case of the effectual network, ends are outcomes of action that depend at any given point in 
time on particular actors, and the immediate transformations they commit to.   
In terms of our analysis of grue markets, we need to consider two sets of goals, one 
consisting of the goals of individual members, and the other that of the effectual network.  While 
individual members may have a variety of goals in different hierarchical schemes with different 
levels of ambiguities, the network’s goals are always particular transformations on X.  Therefore, 
only those individual goals would be relevant to the analysis that any given member can embody 
in particular transformations on the extant artifact.  A lucid illustration of this can be found in 
Lindblom (1959).  When lawmakers sit down to draft a bill on say, partial birth abortion, their 
prior positions on the issue are relevant only to the extent that they agree or disagree about 
particular provisions of the bill, sometimes only to the extent of individual clauses.  Therefore, 
even arch opponents on principles can come together at the margin on particular provisions and 
end up with a draft of the bill both sides can live with.  And those who may be ambivalent at the 
level of principles can commit to particular provisions without first resolving their confusions as 
to the larger values involved.  Similarly, for our analysis, we do not need to make any precise 
assumptions on individual preferences and goal clarity.  Only the actual commitments the 
stakeholders make to particular transformations of X drive the fabrication of the new market.  
Reasons for making commitments may range from pre-existent preferences to docility, passions 
and convictions to self-interest and fun, reformatory zeal to indifference. 
Furthermore, each individual commits only what s/he can afford to lose to make those 
particular transformations.  This is especially true in the initial stages of the network since it is 
far from clear what X will eventually turn out to be, let alone what it would be worth.  Therefore, 
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any calculations of expected return, even if actually carried out by members of the network, can 
be considered highly speculative guesstimates at best.  Effectuators, therefore, tend to focus 
instead, on the down side – i.e. how much they are willing to lose on investing in the effectual 
commitment.  This calculation of affordable loss need not depend on any predictive assessment 
of the value of X.  Instead, it can almost entirely be based upon a variety of things that 
effectuators already know, such as, their current net worth, reliable sources of future income 
streams, personal expense requirements, commitments already made to others, and so on.  
Making a commitment based upon affordable loss calculations minimizes (and can even 
eliminate) reliance on predictive information. 
As we shall see next, a similar non-predictive logic undergirds ignoring opportunity costs 
in the commitment to C. 
Commitment to C and not D:  The problem of opportunity costs 
The key to the effectual commitment – i.e. the reduction of Type I errors even at the cost 
of Type II errors – is that it does not predict but actually sorts prospects into customers and non-
customers, or more specifically, into stakeholders and non-stakeholders.  Each stakeholder 
comes on board the network by actually committing to and investing in particular local shapes 
and features of the emerging new market, subject to the constraints of everyone else already on 
board.  In other words, every new member who actually comes on board either re-shapes the 
market to the extent they can persuade others to change their views or re-shapes their own 
preferences to the extent they are docile toward the views of the others.  Notice that we are not 
suggesting a new “charisma” theory of entrepreneurship, although some members of the network 
may indeed be more charismatic than others.  Instead, we rest our claims upon the fact that all 
human beings, leader and member alike, are (to varying degrees) persuadable (Simon, 1993). 
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Membership in the effectual network is not determined on the basis of who “should” 
come on board, but is rather determined by who “can” come on board subject to both the global 
constraint of transforming a grue market and the pool of local constraints that have been 
negotiated thus far.  Some of these constraints are lumpier than others.  For example, any non-
reversible investments such as those involved in R&D reduce the fluidity of the pool and lower 
its ability to blend in the contributions and constraints of potential new members.  Eventually 
some lumpy constraints coagulate into a stable local structure that forms a non-negotiable part of 
the new artifact.  New members now have to negotiate with this stable structure as a single unit 
and new pools of contributions and constraints have to evolve around this structure, forming 
hierarchies of stable structures in the growing artifact.   
Through each of these stable structures, within the constraints outlined, the effectual 
network seeks to control the shape of the future to the extent it is controllable through human 
action.  In other words, the effectual network, especially in the initial stages, does not have any 
global criteria with which to evaluate the worthiness or otherwise of any particular prospective 
member.  New membership is merely contingent on actual local constraints negotiated with and 
within current membership. A negotiation that results in actual commitments is the only criterion 
that determines membership in the network. Therefore, the notion of any objective opportunity 
costs to membership selection is largely irrelevant because selection in an effectual network is 
largely a process of self-selection, given constraints already at work in the transformation of X.  
In this way, the rejection of opportunity costs with regard to D, also rejects the notion of the 
actual market being one of many possible markets, and incorporates the overall grue 
weltanschauung in which new markets are made from existing components in the actual world.  
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In common sense terms, the decision to ignore D is a function of the uncertainty 
associated with the market for X.  If D exists and is known with reasonable certainty to be a 
customer or supplier for X, then it would not make sense for C and E to proceed as though D 
does not exist.  But in most new markets, there is considerable uncertainty with regard to the 
existence of D.  This is where the effectual logic underlying the network becomes manifest and 
relevant.  Given that E is already involved in the creation of green X and C is already interested 
in blue X (for reasons irrelevant to our analysis as we showed in the previous section), we can 
consider two cases:   
• Either C and E can proceed causally – i.e., as though there exists a market consisting of D for 
X (green and/or blue) largely independent of their particular decisions, in which case, they 
will have to be careful to align their choices with what this market consists of.  Ergo, they 
need to invest in search processes for finding D -- i.e., the best possible sources for customers 
of green X and suppliers of blue X.   
• Or, they can proceed effectually – i.e. as though the market is a result of particular actions 
they take, subject to the possibility of exogenous shocks, and the necessity to modify their 
own selections as the market comes into existence.  In this case, they can proceed to make the 
commitments they negotiated with each other knowing that they may have to renegotiate the 
shape of X if D exists and is willing to commit whatever is necessary to come on board later. 
 
So while the market in which D comes on board and one in which D does not come on 
board would be very different from each other, there is no a priori way to decide which of those 
two markets would be better for C and E to participate in.  Instead it makes sense for them to 
negotiate with any and all members who actually make the commitments required to come on 
board.  In sum, the calculable opportunity costs of not partnering with C always outweigh the 
incalculable opportunity costs of not partnering with imagined D’s elsewhere.  Effectually 
speaking, the bird in hand is always worth more than imagined birds in mythical bushes. 
So far, with regard to the commitment to C, and not D, we have shown the irrelevance of 
opportunity costs in the formation of the effectual network.  But what about the problem of 
opportunism? 
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Commitment to C:  The problem of opportunism 
Our analysis is fully consistent with social networks theories on the role and salience of 
existing ties for each stakeholder in the effectual network.  This is reflected in the fact that 
effectuators begin with who they are, what they know, and whom they know.  But in line with a 
grue universe, our analysis goes beyond the idea that extant networks can be leveraged and 
managed, to encompass the notion that new networks can also be initiated and developed.  We 
use a simple typology of how new networks may be initiated: 
• Networks may form through random chance (Ex:  Two or more people bump into each other at the 
mall or happen to sit next to each other on an airplane) 
• Networks may form in some path dependent fashion (Ex:  Through garbage cans).  These can be 
intentional or unintentional 
• Networks may form through the deliberate activation of an existing network – again either with 
regard to achieving a pre-determined goal (causal initiation) or by imagining ways to exploit an extant 
network (effectual initiation) 
 
The history of entrepreneurial new market creation is full of unusual partnerships leading 
to the emergence of new networks.  Instead of arising naturally as a consequence of existing 
social networks, several of these seminal relationships began as intentional or co-incidental 
garbage cans (Cohen et al 1972), such as the one in which Clark and Andreesen, the founders of 
Netscape, met.  Josiah Wedgwood, too, was introduced to Bentley through his physician while 
he was laid up in bed in Liverpool for many weeks from a knee injury.  As Koehn (1997) 
describes it, “This meeting was a fortuitous one for both men.  It inaugurated a long friendship of 
great depth and intimacy, as well as one of the most important business partnerships of the 
eighteenth century.”   
But the idea of initiating new networks begs the question about the role of social 
networks as the primary arbiters of trust in exchange relationships.  Current theories of 
economics and organizations wrestle with the contradictory behavioral assumptions of 
opportunism and trust.   Opportunism, defined as self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 
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1985), is a fact about human behavior.  As is trust, defined as affect-based belief in moral 
character (Wicks, Berman & Jones, 1998).   
Sociologists have tried to leap across this divide by positing a tertius gaudens of one kind 
or another, who through the good fortune of his/her position in a social network acts as an arbiter 
of trust and legitimacy between two opportunistic parties.  Coleman (1990), for example, 
identifies the entrepreneur as an arbiter of trust, while Olson (1986) points to the government, as 
the tertius gaudens of ultimate resort. 
Based on a detailed review of the vast literatures on this subject that we will not present 
in this paper, we conclude, in line with several scholars in the field (Rabin 1998, Simon 1993, 
Moran and Ghoshal 1996, Mosschandreas 1998), as follows: Both the volume of theorizing and 
the weight of empirical evidence suggest that it might be fruitful to move away from strong 
behavioral assumptions of either opportunism or trust-based ties toward a more realistic starting 
point – namely, that in most cases at the beginning of the formation of a network, actors simply 
cannot predict the motives of those they interact with nor can they always predict their own 
motivations.  That is why it makes sense for effectuators to rely on actual commitments rather 
than on predictions based on past behavior, or promises endorsed by third parties. 
In the effectual network, only those members who make actual commitments form the 
membership of the network.  This provides a substantial deterrent to free riders and opportunists.  
Furthermore, by requiring a large amount of willingness to change the shape of X without 
guarantees of larger shares of the eventual pie, the effectual network tends to select out 
opportunists and select in intelligent altruists including those who persuade others to be altruistic.  
Also, opportunists have real opportunity costs in the form of other more predictable markets with 
low hanging fruit (as opposed to those under construction through effectual networks).  Joining 
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and working with an effectual network requires them to forgo those other opportunities that 
provide more immediate and surer gains.  To a great extent, therefore, effectual networks 
eradicate the need to overcome opportunism, by merely making it irrelevant to the creation of 
new markets.   
Note that this does not mean that the very same members of the effectual network who 
behave in an intelligently altruistic fashion in the beginning will not behave opportunistically as 
the market coalesces into more predictable outcome distributions.  All that the effectual network 
does is to cue in intelligent altruism at the earlier stages, leaving open the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior later in the development of the market.  This is very much in keeping with 
an evolutionary explanation for the concurrent existence of opportunism and altruism in human 
behavior.  As Thompson (1998: 305) states:   
Because selection has sometimes favored individualistic and at other times collectivist behavior, 
the human species has evolved not only the capacity for both kinds of action but probably also a 
complex cognitive device for figuring out in a given situation which kind of action, collective or 
individualistic, is likely to produce the best genetic outcome. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We started out trying to understand how an entrepreneur/manager can act in a world 
where markets are grue.  We showed that forging a network of stakeholders based on actual 
commitments to particular transformations of extant realities into components of the new market 
entails an effectual logic – i.e., a logic that allows who comes on board to determine what the 
new market will look like, rather than let predicted visions of the new market drive the search for 
and selection of new members,.  We end by presenting a provocative argument as to why acting 
as though the world were grue matters. 
Arguing from a pragmatic philosophical standpoint (a la Davidson, 1986) that people can 
and do understand about other people’s minds and feelings through comparisons with their own, 
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Sen (1999) insisted in his Nobel lecture that a constructive social choice theory would be 
possible that would reject the received wisdom of welfare economists on the impossibility of 
inter-personal comparisons of utility (IPCU).  He posed two questions that need to be answered 
in building a constructive social choice theory.  The first assumes IPCU is possible and asks 
whether something as complex as IPCU can be incorporated into our formal theorizing.  His 
answer to this question is a resounding, “Yes!”  The second question asks, “On what kind of 
information can we sensibly base IPCU?”  Here he suggested that the answer has to combine 
epistemology with practical reason and called for a reexamination of the informational basis for 
interpersonal comparisons. 
To begin examining how the model of effectual interaction described in this paper could 
feed into such a reexamination, we look to Davidson, as suggested by Sen.  In a landmark thesis 
titled Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective the philosopher Davidson (2001) consolidated a 
lifetime of trying to understand topics in the philosophy of mind from a variety of areas such as 
semantic theory, epistemology and ethics into a series of essays culminating in an article titled 
Three varieties of knowledge.  The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy states: 
In ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’, Davidson develops the metaphor of triangulation into the idea 
of a three-way conceptual interdependence between knowledge of oneself, knowledge of others 
and knowledge of the world. Just as knowledge of language cannot be separated from our more 
general knowledge of the world, so Davidson argues that knowledge of oneself, knowledge of 
other persons and knowledge of a common, ‘objective’ world form an interdependent set of 
concepts no one of which is possible in the absence of the others. 
 
The effectual logic of acting in a grue world that we have developed in this paper 
leverages the three-legged structure of uncertainty – three varieties of ignorance.  The 
effectual commitment overcomes objective ignorance – namely, Knight’s ‘true’ uncertainty 
(ignorance of what probabilities to assign) and the more recent problem of isotropy 
(ignorance of the relevance of particular pieces of information to the problem at hand) -- by 
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first limiting the actor to the known (who I am, what I know, and whom I know) and the 
possible (what I can actually do); and then making the selection within this small set 
dependent upon the next stakeholder who makes an actual commitment to transform this set 
in a particular way. The effectual commitment further overcomes intersubjective ignorance – 
namely, the lack of knowledge about how opportunistic or trustworthy the other party to the 
interaction is – by proceeding strictly on the basis of actual commitments, even to the 
exclusion of other possible commitments; and finally, it turns subjective ignorance – i.e., 
goal ambiguity into an asset, that enables the known and the actually possible for each 
individual actor to be embodied into effectual commitments that specify what the new 
artifact – i.e. the new market – will be. 
In thinking through a philosophical basis for the growing scholarship on new markets, 
this paper outlines a descriptive theory of how a new market comes to be.  The theory makes 
minimal assumptions about human behavior and interaction, and has been empirically 
evidenced elsewhere (Sarasvathy, 1998; Dew, 2003).  It is also a prescriptive theory for 
action under three varieties of ignorance that does not entail fuzzy concepts such as intuition, 
much pilloried “deviations” from rationality, or reliance on predictive calculations resting on 
unreliable assumptions.  But much work remains undone in terms of relating our 
prescriptions to measures of performance.  While we hope to undertake some attempts in that 
direction in the future, we restrict ourselves to two speculative hypotheses here:  First, we 
suspect that our model is more about reducing the costs of failure than about increasing the 
chances of success; and that leads to our second suspicion that our model argues for a method 
of reconciliation of social equity and economic efficiency in the macro-environment in line 
with Sen’s (1999) suggestions for a solution to the social choice problem.   
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APPENDIX 1 
Reid (1997) 
In early 1994, Bill Foss loaded Mosaic (the world’s first web browser created by Marc Andreesen) 
onto his computer and watched as Jim Clark clicked his way through the internet.  As Reid (1997) 
describes it:  It was Clark’s first glimpse of the Web.  Before he was done, he E-mailed Marc.  You may 
not know me, but I’m the founder of Silicon Graphics, his message began.  Reid goes on to explain that 
the first few meetings between the two men did not go very well: Foss remembers Marc as “this kind of 
ungainly twenty-two-or twenty-three-year-old kid [who] doesn’t quite know what to make of this 
corporate culture, so he’s put a tie on” (ties were passenger-pigeon rarities in the corridors of the 
company Clark had founded)… But.. Marc “kind of built up his comfort level with Jim” over the 
subsequent weeks, Foss recalls. 
 
Stanford website 
Clark left Silicon Graphics in January of 1994 with the vague intention of starting a new software 
company, perhaps involving interactive television. Near the end of his time at SGI, colleague Bill Foss 
showed Clark a new program he found. That program was Mosaic. Clark was smitten, and he took note of 
a Mosaic page showing Andreessen and where he was. Clark contacted Andreessen and the two met, with 
excellent results. "He was one of the sharpest people I had ever run across," Clark told the San Jose 
Mercury News. And Andreessen’s reaction to Clark, “His vision, knowledge about markets and ability to 
execute were right on target." The two discussed various business opportunities and developed no sure-
fire money-making idea, but in the end Clark's entrepreneurial spirit could not be checked. "You think of 
something to do," Clark instructed Andreessen, "and I'll fund it."  
For Andreessen, there was no reason not to join forces with Jim Clark. Friction had been building 
between the NCSA management and the Mosaic programmers for several months, and Andreessen was 
looking for a way to get out. Management issued glowing press reports about Mosaic, but declined to 
mention Andreessen or the other programmers in any great detail, thus preventing them from receiving 
the accolades which they were due. In essence, the young team of Mosaic programmers saw themselves 
as under-paid, under-appreciated, and overworked.  
Andreessen soon left the NCSA to found Mosaic Communications Corporation. Shortly thereafter he 
sent e-mail to his former colleagues: "Something's going down. Be ready to move."  
The company was born. 
 
Maney (2003) – In USA Today 
At NCSA in 1993, Mittelhauser and Totic recall, Andreessen got fed up with battles over Mosaic, so 
he left for Silicon Valley.  Marc was like an ongoing soap opera," Totic recalls. "He got this pathetic job 
where he was, like, an intern, and he was e-mailing us daily dispatches. Then one of them said that he'd 
met Jim Clark. We were all like, 'Who's Jim Clark?' " 
In one of those small but pivotal events in history, Bill Foss, an assistant to Clark at computer maker 
Silicon Graphics, then one of the Valley's most exciting names, had told Clark he should e-mail 
Andreessen. Foss had followed Mosaic and knew Clark was casting about for another company idea. But 
Clark barely knew anything about the Internet. At SGI, he'd worked mostly on the hot field of interactive 
television. Andreessen was sick of Mosaic and wanted to do something else. "We had two business 
plans," Andreessen says. One was in interactive TV. The other was to build an online gaming network for 
Nintendo machines. 
One day, Clark says, he and Andreessen were in Clark's living room, struggling over ideas. 
Andreessen said he wanted to work with his NCSA buddies but was afraid they'd get recruited 
somewhere else. "Right there, in that moment, we said, 'Let's reproduce Mosaic,' " Clark says. "We 
hopped on a plane and flew to Illinois in the middle of a thunderstorm. We met the (rest of the NCSA 
gang) at a hotel and recruited them in 24 hours, and suddenly we had a company."  To celebrate, "We all 
went to the hotel bar," Totic says. "I remember there was a lot of Jägermeister." 
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